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I. 
IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE 
AND CERTIFICATES PURSUANT TO FED. R. APP. P. 29 
 Amicus curiae, the American Center for Law & Justice (“ACLJ”), is an 
organization dedicated to defending constitutional liberties secured by law.  ACLJ 
attorneys have argued before the Supreme Court of the United States and other 
federal and state courts in numerous cases involving constitutional issues.  E.g., 
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009); Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. 
Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993).  ACLJ attorneys also have 
participated as amicus curiae in numerous cases involving constitutional issues 
before the Supreme Court and lower federal courts. 
 The ACLJ has been active in litigation concerning the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (“PPACA”).  The 
ACLJ filed amici curiae briefs in the following challenges to the PPACA:  Virginia 
v. Sebelius, No. 3:10-CV-188-HEH (E.D. Va.); Florida v. United States Dep’t of 
Health & Human Servs., No. 3:10-CV-91-RV/EMT (N.D. Fla.); TMLC v. Obama, 
No. 10-2388 (6th Cir.); and Virginia v. Sebelius, Nos. 11-1057, 11-1058 (4th Cir.). 
 Additionally, the ACLJ represents the plaintiffs in Mead v. Holder, No. 
1:10-CV-00950-GK (D.D.C.), appeal filed, Seven-Sky v. Holder, No. 11-5047 
(D.C. Cir.), another case challenging the PPACA.  As such, the ACLJ has an 
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interest that may be affected by the instant appeal because any decision by this 
court would be persuasive authority in Seven-Sky. 
Moreover, this brief is filed on behalf of amici curiae United States 
Representatives Paul Broun, Robert Aderholt, Todd Akin, Steve Austria, Michele 
Bachmann, Spencer Bachus, Roscoe Bartlett, Marsha Blackburn, Larry Bucshon, 
Dan Burton, John Campbell, Francisco “Quico” Canseco, Eric Cantor, Mike 
Conaway, Scott DesJarlais, Blake Farenthold, Stephen Fincher, Chuck 
Fleischmann, John Fleming, Bill Flores, Virginia Foxx, Trent Franks, Scott 
Garrett, Bob Gibbs, Phil Gingrey, Louie Gohmert, Tom Graves, Tim Griffin, 
Gregg Harper, Vicky Hartzler, Wally Herger, Tim Huelskamp, Randy Hultgren, 
Lynn Jenkins, Bill Johnson, Walter Jones, Jim Jordan, Mike Kelly, Steve King, 
John Kline, Doug Lamborn, Jeff Landry, James Lankford, Robert Latta, Cynthia 
Lummis, Donald Manzullo, Kenny Marchant, Kevin McCarthy, Tom McClintock, 
Thaddeus McCotter, Cathy McMorris Rodgers, Gary Miller, Jeff Miller, Randy 
Neugebauer, Richard Nugent, Alan Nunnelee, Pete Olson, Ron Paul, Steve Pearce, 
Mike Pence, Joe Pitts, Mike Pompeo, Bill Posey, Ben Quayle, Scott Rigell, Phil 
Roe, Steve Scalise, Bobby Schilling, Lamar Smith, Marlin Stutzman, Tim 
Walberg, Joe Walsh, Daniel Webster, and Don Young, who are seventy-four 
members of the United States House of Representatives in the One Hundred 
Twelfth Congress.  This brief is also filed on behalf of the Constitutional 
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Committee to Challenge the President and Congress on Health Care, which 
consists of over 70,000 Americans from across the country who oppose the 
individual mandate.   
Amici curiae are dedicated to the founding principles of limited government 
and to the corollary precept that Article I of the Constitution contains boundaries 
that Congress may not trespass—no matter how serious the nation’s healthcare 
problems.  Amici curiae believe that the Constitution does not empower Congress 
to require Americans to purchase government-approved health insurance or pay a 
penalty. 
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29(a), amici curiae certify 
that the parties have consented to the filing of this brief.  Also, pursuant to Federal 
Rule of Appellate Procedure 29(c)(5), amici curiae certify that no counsel for any 
party authored this brief in whole or in part, nor did any person or entity, other than 
amici and its counsel, make a monetary contribution to the preparation and 
submission of this brief. 
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II. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
 
I. Whether the district court properly concluded that Section 1501 of the 
PPACA exceeds Congress’s authority under Article I of the Constitution.  
Answer:  Yes. 
II. Whether the district court properly concluded that Section 1501 is not 
severable from the remainder of the PPACA, and, therefore, the entire 
PPACA is unconstitutional.  Answer:  Yes. 
III. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 Amici curiae address only two parts of the district court’s final decision and 
judgment and urge affirmance of those two parts:  first, the district court’s 
conclusion that Section 1501 (also referred to as “the individual mandate”) is 
unconstitutional, and second, the district court’s conclusion that Section 1501 is 
not severable from the rest of the PPACA, thus making the entire PPACA 
unconstitutional. 
 First, the district court properly concluded that the individual mandate 
exceeds Congress’s authority under Article I of the Constitution.  The Commerce 
Clause authorizes Congress to regulate voluntary economic activity, not economic 
Case: 11-11021     Date Filed: 05/05/2011     Page: 14 of 43
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decisions, as the federal government maintains.1/  The Commerce Clause does not 
authorize Congress to regulate the inactivity of American citizens by compelling 
them to buy a good or service (such as health insurance) as a condition of their 
lawful residence in this country or pay a penalty.  Because the individual mandate 
requires citizens to purchase health insurance or be penalized, the PPACA exceeds 
Congress’s Constitutional authority. 
 Second, the district court properly concluded that the individual mandate is 
not severable from the remainder of the PPACA, which, therefore, is invalid in 
full.  Although an earlier version of the health care legislation contained a 
severability clause, the PPACA does not, and the PPACA’s remaining provisions 
cannot function without the individual mandate.  These two factors lead to the 
conclusion that Congress would not have passed the PPACA without the individual 
mandate.  Consequently, because the individual mandate is unconstitutional and 
not severable from the remainder of the PPACA, the entire PPACA must be held 
invalid, as the district court so ruled. 
                                                 
1/ The federal government argued in the district court that the individual 
mandate is constitutional because, among other things, it “regulates economic 
decisions regarding the way in which health care services are paid for.”  Doc. 55-1 
at 35 (emphasis added); see also Doc. 82-1 at 2, 25; Doc. 150 at 52-56.  Although 
on appeal the federal government emphasizes the argument that the individual 
mandate regulates conduct or activity, the importance of the distinction between 
decisions and activity is still critical to the proper resolution of this case and will be 
discussed herein.  






THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED 
 
THAT SECTION 1501 OF THE PPACA IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
 
BECAUSE IT EXCEEDS CONGRESS’S ARTICLE I AUTHORITY 
 
 The Supreme Court has noted that  
The Constitution creates a Federal Government of enumerated 
powers.  See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.  As James Madison wrote, “the 
powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal 
government are few and defined.  Those which are to remain in the 
State governments are numerous and indefinite.”  
 
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) (quoting The Federalist No. 45, 
pp. 292-93 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961)).   
1. 
 
Section 1501 Exceeds The Boundaries 
 
Of Congress’s Article I Power 
 
 Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution grants Congress the power “[t]o 
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with 
the Indian tribes.”  Although the scope of this power has been broadened from the 
original understanding of a power to “prescribe the rule by which commerce is to 
be governed,” Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196 (1824), the Supreme 
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Court has consistently held that Congress’s assertion and exercise of this power is 
not unlimited. 
 A review of four key Commerce Clause cases demonstrates that Section 
1501 exceeds the outer bounds of Congressional power and underscores that the 
district court properly ruled that Section 1501 is unconstitutional.  United States v. 
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); 
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
a. 
 
Lopez And Morrison Repudiate The Federal Government’s Argument That 
 
The Commerce Clause Power Encompasses Economic Decisions 
 
That Substantially Affect Interstate Commerce 
 
 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), and United States v. Morrison, 
529 U.S. 598 (2000), illustrate that the Commerce Clause cannot be stretched to 
authorize Section 1501.  These two recent cases set the outer limits of Congress’s 
Commerce Clause power.  According to these two cases, Congress can only 
control voluntary economic/commercial activity (for example, the production, 
distribution, and consumption of commodities) and cannot control non-economic 
activity under the Commerce Clause.  Because Congress cannot control non-
economic activity, Congress obviously cannot control the non-activity of 
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Americans and certainly cannot control their economic decisions not to purchase a 
product, here, health insurance. 
 In Lopez, the Court held that the Gun Free School Zones Act, which 
prohibited the possession of a firearm within 1,000 feet of a school, exceeded 
Congress’s Commerce Clause authority because it had “nothing to do with 
‘commerce’ or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define 
those terms.”  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.  The Court discussed Gibbons v. Ogden—
the Court’s first comprehensive review of the Commerce Clause—which stated, 
“‘[c]ommerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is something more:  it is intercourse.  
It describes the commercial intercourse between nations, and parts of nations, in all 
its branches, and is regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on that 
intercourse.’”  Id. at 553 (quoting Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 189-90).  The Gibbons 
Court observed that the power to “regulate” commerce is the power to “‘prescribe 
the rule by which commerce is to be governed’” and noted that “‘[t]he enumeration 
[of the power] presupposes something not enumerated.’” Id. (quoting Gibbons, 22 
U.S. at 194-95, 196); see also id. at 585-88 (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting that 
the original understanding of the Commerce Clause was much more limited than 
the Court’s modern interpretation). 
 The Lopez Court reiterated the observation made in NLRB v. Jones & 
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), that the Commerce Clause “‘must be 
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considered in the light of our dual system of government and may not be extended 
so as to embrace effects upon interstate commerce so indirect and remote that to 
embrace them, in view of our complex society, would effectually obliterate the 
distinction between what is national and what is local and create a completely 
centralized government.’”  Id. at 557 (quoting NLRB, 301 U.S. at 37).  The Lopez 
Court identified three “categories of activity” that the Commerce Clause authorizes 
Congress to regulate: 
First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate 
commerce.  Second, Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the 
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in 
interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from 
intrastate activities.  Finally, Congress’ commerce authority includes 
the power to regulate those activities . . . that substantially affect 
interstate commerce. 
 
Id. at 558-59 (citations omitted). 
 The Court summarized cases dealing with the third category of activity (the 
only category at issue here) as holding that, “[w]here economic activity 
substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation regulating that activity will be 
sustained.”  Id. at 560 (emphasis added).  The Act exceeded Congress’s authority 
because gun possession was not economic activity, nor was the Act  
an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which 
the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity 
were regulated.  It cannot, therefore, be sustained under our cases 
upholding regulations of activities that arise out of or are connected 
with a commercial transaction, which viewed in the aggregate, 
substantially affects interstate commerce. 
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Id. at 561.  The Court found it significant that the Act “‘plows thoroughly new 
ground and represents a sharp break with the long-standing pattern of federal 
firearms legislation.’”  Id. at 563 (citation omitted). 
 The federal government argued in Lopez that the Court should focus on 
whether, through a chain of inferences, possession of guns in a school zone may, in 
the aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce, rather than focusing on 
whether the statute targeted economic activity.  For example, the federal 
government cited the cost-shifting impact on the insurance system, arguing that 
gun possession may lead to violent crime, and “the costs of violent crime are 
substantial, and, through the mechanism of insurance, those costs are spread 
throughout the population.”  Id. at 563-64.  In rejecting these arguments, the Court 
responded by stating: 
We pause to consider the implications of the Government’s arguments.  
The Government admits, under its “costs of crime” reasoning, that 
Congress could regulate not only all violent crime, but all activities that 
might lead to violent crime, regardless of how tenuously they relate to 
interstate commerce. . . .  Similarly, under the Government’s “national 
productivity” reasoning, Congress could regulate any activity that it 
found was related to the economic productivity of individual citizens: 
family law (including marriage, divorce, and child custody), for 
example.  Under the theories that the Government presents in support of 
§ 922(q), it is difficult to perceive any limitation on federal power, even 
in areas such as criminal law enforcement or education where States 
historically have been sovereign.  Thus, if we were to accept the 
Government’s arguments, we are hard pressed to posit any activity by 
an individual that Congress is without power to regulate. 
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Id. at 564 (emphasis added). 
 The Court noted, in rejecting the federal government’s unduly expansive 
view of congressional power, that the Constitution “withhold[s] from Congress a 
plenary police power that would authorize enactment of every type of legislation,” 
id. at 566, and stated, 
[t]o uphold the Government’s contentions here, we would have to pile 
inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert 
congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police 
power of the sort retained by the States. . . .  To [expand the scope of 
the Commerce Clause] would require us to conclude that the 
Constitution’s enumeration of powers does not presuppose something 
not enumerated, . . . and that there never will be a distinction between 
what is truly national and what is truly local. This we are unwilling to 
do. 
 
Id. at 567-68 (citations omitted); see also id. at 577-78 (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(noting the importance of federalism principles in interpreting the scope of the 
Commerce Clause). 
 Section 1501 does not withstand scrutiny under Lopez.  Being lawfully 
present within the United States, like possessing a gun within 1,000 feet of a 
school, is not voluntary commercial or economic activity that substantially affects 
interstate commerce.  The cases Lopez relied upon referred to ongoing commercial 
or economic activities that Congress may regulate,2/ and provide no support for the 
                                                 
 
2/ See, e.g., United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 119 
(1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118 (1941); Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 196. 
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assertion that the power to “‘prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be 
governed’” includes the power to force those who do not want to engage in a 
commercial or economic activity to do so.  See id. at 553 (quoting Gibbons, 22 
U.S. at 196).  As in Lopez, “[t]o uphold the Government’s contentions here, we 
would have to pile inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to 
convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police 
power of the sort retained by the States.”  Id. at 567.  
 A review of Section 1501’s findings illustrates that Congress’s assertion of 
Commerce Clause power is unprecedented in its reach.  First and foremost, 
Congress sought to obscure entirely the distinction between inactivity and 
economic activity by claiming authority over the decision-making of Americans, 
stating “[t]he requirement regulates activity that is commercial and economic in 
nature:  economic and financial decisions about how and when health care is paid 
for, and when health insurance is purchased.”  PPACA § 1501(a)(2)(A), as 
amended by § 10106(a) (emphasis added).  In other words, Congress asserted that 
being lawfully present in the United States without health insurance is the 
economic activity of deciding not to buy health insurance; as such, Congress may 
“regulate” that economic activity by compelling individuals to make a different 
economic decision, that is, to buy health insurance.  Under this reasoning, virtually 
any decision not to buy a good or service would be “economic activity” that can be 
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targeted by a law requiring individuals to buy that good or service. 
 The federal government incorrectly contends that inaction and voluntary 
economic action are no different for Commerce Clause purposes.  The federal 
government’s conclusion is fundamentally flawed because it equates abstract 
economic decision-making with concrete voluntary economic activity.  Most 
American adults make numerous choices on a daily basis concerning when and 
whether to spend money on an array of goods and services.  A person may choose 
to buy X and choose not to buy Y.  Under the federal government’s reasoning, so 
long as Congress has the authority to regulate the interstate market for Y (which is 
often the case), it can mandate that all individuals take part in the market for Y as 
consumers—whether they want to or not.  Congress would merely need to assert 
that because decisions about whether to purchase Y are commercial and economic 
in nature, that individuals’ decisions to not buy Y substantially affect interstate 
commerce.  Such a view, if accepted by this court, would give Congress an 
unprecedented license to regulate American citizens at the expense of the 
Constitution’s system of limited powers. 
 In addition, Congress stated in the PPACA that “[t]he economy loses up to 
$207,000,000,000 a year because of the poorer health and shorter lifespan of the 
uninsured,” and Section 1501 would “significantly reduce this economic cost.”  
PPACA § 1501(a)(2)(E), as amended by § 10106(a).  Poorer health and shorter life 
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spans are often the result of decisions made by Americans regarding their health, 
for example, deciding to smoke, not exercise, and/or eat a high fat diet.  If the 
economic impact of Americans’ poorer health and shorter lifespans provided a 
sufficient basis for Congress to mandate that individuals buy health insurance, then 
Congress could also mandate that individuals take other actions that Congress 
deems necessary to improve health and lengthen life expectancies—such as 
requiring Americans to buy a gym membership, maintain a specific body weight, 
or eat a healthier diet—or pay penalties for failing to do so. 
 Congress also alleged that Section 1501 would lower the cost of health 
insurance premiums because “[t]he cost of providing uncompensated care to the 
uninsured was $43,000,000,000 in 2008,” which was passed on to private insurers 
and individuals who have private insurance.  PPACA § 1501(a)(2)(F), as amended 
by § 10106(a).  The federal government made a virtually identical cost-shifting 
argument in Lopez,3/ but the Supreme Court held that Congress can only reach 
“economic activity” that substantially affects interstate commerce; neither gun 
possession nor lawful presence in the United States is economic activity. 
 Moreover, Congress declared in the PPACA that requiring individuals to 
                                                 
 
3/ “The economic consequences of criminal behavior are substantial . . . and, 
through the mechanism of insurance, spread throughout the population.”  Brief of 
the United States, at *28, n.9, United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (No. 93-1260), 
1994 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 410 (footnote omitted). 
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buy health insurance will benefit those who participate in the health insurance 
market by “increasing the supply of, and demand for, health care services,” 
“reduc[ing] administrative costs and lower[ing] health insurance premiums,” 
“broaden[ing] the health insurance risk pool to include healthy individuals,” and 
“creating effective health insurance markets in which improved health insurance 
products that are guaranteed issue and do not exclude coverage of pre-existing 
conditions can be sold.”  PPACA § 1501(a)(2)(C), (I), (J), as amended by § 
10106(a).  The Commerce Clause has never been understood, however, to allow 
Congress to force unwilling buyers into a market to remedy perceived market 
shortcomings, and Congress has never previously tried to do so, underscoring 
Congress’s previous restraint in respecting the limits of its Constitutional power.  
See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 908-18 (1997) (recognizing that the 
absence of statutes in our history imposing certain obligations suggests Congress’s 
understanding of a lack of such power). 
 There have been many times throughout American history when changing 
market conditions was a desirable goal, yet 
never before has [Congress] used its commerce power to mandate that 
an individual person engage in an economic transaction with a private 
company.  Regulating the auto industry or paying “cash for clunkers” is 
one thing; making everyone buy a Chevy is quite another.  Even during 
World War II, the federal government did not mandate that individual 
citizens purchase war bonds. 
 
Randy E. Barnett, Is health-care reform constitutional?, WASH. POST., Mar. 21, 
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2010, at B2.  Although the PPACA is the first federal law to cross the line between 
encouraging increased market activity and mandating individual purchases, it will 
certainly not be the last if it is upheld. 
 In addition to Lopez, United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), 
demonstrates that Section 1501 exceeds Congress’s power.  In Morrison, the Court 
held that a portion of the Violence Against Women Act, which provided a civil 
remedy for victims of gender-motivated violence, exceeded Congress’s Commerce 
Clause authority because “[g]ender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in any 
sense of the phrase, economic activity.”  Id. at 613 (emphasis added).  Congress 
found that gender-motivated violence deters interstate travel and commerce, 
diminishes national productivity, increases medical costs, and decreases the supply 
of and demand for interstate products, id. at 615, but the Court rejected the 
argument “that Congress may regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct 
based solely on that conduct’s aggregate effect on interstate commerce.”  Id. at 
617.  The Court noted that cases in which it had upheld an assertion of Commerce 
Clause authority due to the regulated activity’s substantial effects on interstate 
commerce involved the regulation of “commerce,” an “economic enterprise,” 
“economic activity,” or “some sort of economic endeavor.”  Id. at 610-11.  The 
Court observed that the government’s attenuated method of reasoning was similar 
to the reasoning offered in Lopez and raised concerns that “Congress might use the 
Case: 11-11021     Date Filed: 05/05/2011     Page: 26 of 43
17 
Commerce Clause to completely obliterate the Constitution’s distinction between 
national and local authority. . . .”  Id. at 615. 
 Morrison illustrates that Section 1501 exceeds Congress’s Commerce 
Clause authority for the same reasons cited above with respect to Lopez.  
Following the attenuated chain of inferences offered in support of Section 1501 
would lead to an unchecked federal police power allowing Congress, for the first 
time in our country’s history, to mandate under its Commerce Clause power a host 
of purchases by American citizens. 
b. 
 
Neither Wickard Nor Raich Supports A 
 
Congressional Power To Regulate Inactivity 
 
 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), and Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 
(2005), two cases the federal government chiefly relies on, do not support its 
position that Section 1501 is constitutional or that Congress can control the 
inactivity or economic decisions of American citizens. 
 In Wickard, the Supreme Court upheld provisions of the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act that authorized a penalty to be imposed on the plaintiff for 
growing more wheat than the marketing quota set for his farm.  The Act limited 
wheat production to limit supply and stabilize market prices.  Wickard, 317 U.S. at 
115-16.  The plaintiff grew more than twice the quota for his farm; he typically 
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sold a portion of his wheat in the marketplace, used a portion for feeding his 
livestock and home consumption, and kept the rest for future use.  Id. at 114-15.  
He argued that the Act exceeded Congress’s Commerce Clause power because the 
activities regulated were local and had only an indirect effect upon interstate 
commerce.  Id. at 119.  The Court upheld the Act, stating “even if appellee’s 
activity be local and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, 
whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic 
effect on interstate commerce. . . .”  Id. at 125. 
 The Court reviewed a summary of the economics of the wheat industry, 
which outlined the interrelationship between market prices and wheat supply in 
local communities, the United States, and the world, id. at 125-28, and observed 
that “[t]he effect of the statute before us is to restrict the amount [of wheat] which 
may be produced for market and the extent as well to which one may forestall 
resort to the market by producing to meet his own needs.”  Id. at 127 (emphasis 
added).  In other words, the penalty targeted farmers who, like the plaintiff, 
voluntarily grew far more wheat than the amount needed to fill their own demand 
in order to sell most of the excess in the market.  
 As such, Wickard does not stand for the proposition that Congress may 
regulate non-economic activity, or inactivity, that may have some relationship to 
interstate commerce so long as it is related to a broad scheme regulating interstate 
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commerce, as the government would want this court to believe.  Rather, the Court 
held that Congress may regulate purely local economic activity (voluntarily 
growing a marketable commodity that may be sold in the market or consumed by 
the grower) when that economic activity, taken in the aggregate, is directly tied to 
and substantially effects interstate commerce. 
 Wickard provides no support for Section 1501.  The statute in Wickard 
targeted a specific economic activity—the over-production of wheat, the excess of 
which was often sold in the market—which substantially affected prices in the 
interstate market for that commodity.  Congress could not have dealt with the issue 
of low wheat prices by declaring that all Americans must buy a specific amount of 
wheat or pay a penalty for failing to do so.  An individual’s decision to not buy a 
specific amount of wheat, when viewed in the aggregate, would certainly have 
impacted overall demand for wheat as well as wheat prices, yet the power “[t]o 
regulate Commerce . . . among the several States,” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, would 
not authorize a mandate that individuals who do not want to buy wheat must do so.  
Similarly, Wickard provides no support for Section 1501’s mandate that 
individuals who do not want to engage in a commercial transaction (purchasing 
health insurance) must do so or suffer a penalty, and, thus, does not support the 
government’s incorrect conclusion that Congress’s Commerce Clause power 
extends to regulating economic decisions rather than economic activities.  See 
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Commonwealth of Virginia v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 781 (E.D. Va. 2010) 
(rejecting the government’s expansive interpretation of “activity” as lacking logical 
limitation or support from Commerce Clause jurisprudence.) 
 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), also does not support the 
constitutionality of Section 1501.  In Raich, the Court considered “whether 
Congress’ power to regulate interstate markets for medicinal substances 
encompasses the portions of those markets that are supplied with drugs produced 
and consumed locally.”  Id. at 9.  The Controlled Substances Act (CSA) created a 
“closed regulatory system” governing the manufacture, distribution, and 
possession of controlled substances in order to “conquer drug abuse and to control 
the legitimate and illegitimate traffic in controlled substances.”  Id. at 12-13.  
Under the CSA, the manufacture, distribution, or possession of marijuana was a 
criminal offense.  Id. at 14. 
 California residents who wanted to use marijuana for medicinal purposes 
under state law brought an as-applied challenge to the CSA, not a facial challenge 
as here.  Importantly, the Court emphasized that 
Respondents in this case do not dispute that passage of the CSA, as part 
of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, was 
well within Congress’ commerce power. . . .  Nor do they contend that 
any provision or section of the CSA amounts to an unconstitutional 
exercise of congressional authority.  Rather, respondents’ challenge is 
actually quite limited; they argue that the CSA’s categorical prohibition 
of the manufacture and possession of marijuana as applied to the 
intrastate manufacture and possession of marijuana for medical 
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purposes pursuant to California law exceeds Congress’ authority under 
the Commerce Clause. 
 
Id. at 15 (emphasis added). 
 The Court held that “[t]he CSA is a valid exercise of federal power, even as 
applied to the troubling facts of this case.”  Id. at 9.  The Court stated, “[o]ur case 
law firmly establishes Congress’ power to regulate purely local activities that are 
part of an economic ‘class of activities’ that have a substantial effect on interstate 
commerce.”  Id. at 17 (citations omitted; emphasis added).  Moreover, “[w]hen 
Congress decides that the ‘total incidence’ of a practice poses a threat to a national 
market, it may regulate the entire class.”  Id. (citing Perez v. United States, 402 
U.S. 146, 154-55 (1971)).  As such, “when ‘a general regulatory statute bears a 
substantial relation to commerce, the de minimis character of individual instances 
arising under that statute is of no consequence.’”  Id.  (citation omitted). 
 The Court stated that Wickard’s key holding was that “Congress can regulate 
purely intrastate activity that is not itself ‘commercial,’ in that it is not produced 
for sale, if it concludes that failure to regulate that class of activity would undercut 
the regulation of the interstate market in that commodity.”  Id. at 18.  The Court 
declared that in both Wickard and Raich, “the regulation is squarely within 
Congress’ commerce power because production of the commodity meant for home 
consumption, be it wheat or marijuana, has a substantial effect on supply and 
demand in the national market for that commodity.”  Id. at 19.  Moreover, “the 
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activities regulated by the CSA are quintessentially economic. . . .  The CSA is a 
statute that regulates the production, distribution, and consumption of commodities 
for which there is an established, and lucrative, interstate market.”  Id. at 25-26 
(emphasis added). 
 Raich provides no support for Section 1501.  Unlike Raich, Plaintiffs here 
are not bringing an as-applied challenge to a concededly valid regulatory scheme.  
Rather, Plaintiffs contend that Section 1501 on its face exceeds Congress’s 
authority and should be declared unconstitutional.  Thus, Raich’s emphasis on the 
reluctance of courts to prohibit individual applications of a valid statutory scheme 
due to the de minimis nature of the impact of the plaintiff’s local conduct is not 
implicated by this case. 
 In addition, the statute in Raich (like the statute in Wickard) sought to 
discourage an ongoing “quintessentially economic” activity:  “the production, 
distribution, and consumption of commodities for which there is an established, 
and lucrative, interstate market.”  Id. at 25-26.  The Court repeatedly emphasized 
that the substantial effects test governs the authority of Congress to target 
“activities that are part of an economic ‘class of activities.’”  Id. at 17 (emphasis 
added) (citation omitted).  Since the statutory scheme was concededly valid, the 
Court presupposed that “the [regulated] class of activities . . . [was] within the 
reach of federal power.” Id. at 23.  By contrast, Section 1501 does not regulate an 
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ongoing voluntarily economic class of activities “within the reach of federal 
power.”  See id.  Lawful presence in the United States, without more, is not an 
economic class of activities akin to the production and distribution of a marketable 
commodity.  Raich does not support the idea that the targeted economic class of 
activities does not need to consist of activity but includes abstract decisions to not 
purchase a good or service. 
 In sum, Supreme Court Commerce Clause jurisprudence does not support a 
ruling that Section 1501 is constitutional.  As the district court here properly 
concluded, “[i]t would be a radical departure from existing case law to hold that 
Congress can regulate inactivity under the Commerce Clause.  If [Congress] has 
the power to compel an otherwise passive individual into a commercial transaction 




Congress Seeks Federal Police Powers 
 
 If Congress can coerce a commercial transaction simply by asserting, as it 
did in the PPACA, that a decision to not enter the transaction “is commercial and 
economic in nature, and substantially affects interstate commerce,” PPACA § 
1501(a)(1), and by listing a series of “[e]ffects on the national economy and 
interstate commerce,” id. § 1501(a)(2), as amended by § 10106(a), the universe of 
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commercial transactions that Congress could force Americans to engage in would 
be practically limitless.  Very little commercial activity that Congress decided to 
require individuals to engage in would be considered too trivial or local to elude 
the commerce power.  When that principle is coupled with the assumption in the 
PPACA that Congress can regulate commercial inactivity by coercing citizens to 
purchase any given product, there is no constitutional obstacle to the complete 
federal government micro-management of Americans’ financial decision-making. 
For example, to try to stabilize the American automobile industry, the 
United States Treasury authorized loans to bail out General Motors and Chrysler.4/  
Because selling more cars would help restore GM and Chrysler to profitability, 
Congress could rationally determine that requiring all Americans above a certain 
income level to purchase a new GM or Chrysler automobile would help ensure that 
the bailout’s purpose—GM’s and Chrysler’s survival—is achieved.  Under the 
federal government’s reasoning, Congress would be acting within its commerce 
power.  After all, the decision whether to buy a car would be, by the federal 
government’s reasoning, a commercial and economic one, viewed in the aggregate, 
that Congress can regulate under the Commerce Clause.  This especially would be 
true, under the federal government’s reasoning, if Congress passed a law that no 
                                                 
4/ Press Release, United States Dep’t of the Treasury, Secretary Paulson 
Statement on Stabilizing the Automotive Industry (Dec. 19, 2008), 
http://www.treas.gov/press/ releases/hp1332.htm. 
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one could be refused the purchase of a car (similar to the existing law that no one 
may be refused emergency room care). 
Likewise, under the federal government’s reasoning, Congress could 
rationally determine that a lack of exercise contributes to poor health, which 
increases health care expenses and the cost of health insurance, and threatens 
Congress’s attempt to lower health care and health insurance costs.  If so Congress 
could require Americans to purchase health club memberships, lose weight, or 
open up a money market account.   
 These are not far-fetched conclusions, especially when one considers the 
response by the federal government’s attorney to a question by the district court 
here and the statements of two prominent supporters of the constitutionality of the 
PPACA.  During oral argument, the district court asked the federal government’s 
attorney whether Law Professor and Dean Erwin Chemerinsky was correct in 
saying, while defending the individual mandate, that “‘Congress could use its 
commerce power to require people to buy cars.’”  The federal government’s 
attorney responded that “maybe Dean Chemerinsky is right.’”  Doc. 150 at 46-47.  
Also, during the February 2, 2011, hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee 
on the PPACA’s constitutionality, the possibility of a “broccoli mandate” and 
compelled gym memberships were discussed. While defending the individual 
mandate’s constitutionality, former Solicitor General and Harvard law professor 
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Charles Fried testified that under the view of the commerce power that would 
justify the individual mandate, Congress could compel everyone to buy broccoli 
and join a health club.5/ 
In short, all private decisions to not purchase something can be characterized 
under the federal government’s reasoning as commercial and economic activity 
and will likely, in the aggregate, affect interstate commerce.  If this court upholds 
the individual mandate to force private citizens to buy health insurance, the effect 
would be to strip any remaining limits on Congress’s power to control individual 
economic behavior.  As Judge Hudson properly explained, in ruling the individual 
mandate unconstitutional, the unchecked expansion of Congressional power as 
suggested by the individual mandate “would invite unbridled exercise of federal 
police powers.”  Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 788. 
When President Truman likewise sought to expand federal power over a 
substantial portion of the economy by seizing American steel mills, the Supreme 
Court was keenly aware of the threat to the Constitution and to Americans’ liberty.  
As Justice Frankfurter explained in his concurring opinion, to provide effective 
“limitations on the power of governors over the governed,” this Nation’s founders 
                                                 
5/ Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing on the Constitutionality of the 
Affordable Care Act, February 2, 2011, available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/ 
hearings/hearing.cfm?id=4964; Doc. 167 at 4-5 n.2. 
 
Case: 11-11021     Date Filed: 05/05/2011     Page: 36 of 43
27 
rested the structure of our central government on the system of checks 
and balances.  For them the doctrine of separation of powers was not 
mere theory; it was a felt necessity. . . .  These long-headed statesmen 
had no illusion that our people enjoyed biological or psychological or 
sociological immunities from the hazards of concentrated power. . . .  
The accretion of dangerous power does not come in a day.  It does 
come, however slowly, from the generative force of unchecked 
disregard of the restrictions that fence in even the most disinterested 
assertion of authority. 
 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 593-94 (1952) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (emphasis added).  
 The principles of federalism and a limited federal government, like the 
separation of powers, are part of the system of checks and balances essential to 
limiting centralized governmental power and protecting liberty.  Upholding the 
individual mandate would effectively confer upon Congress “a plenary police 
power,” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566, over all individual economic decisions and place 
Americans’ economic liberty at risk.  See Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 781, 788.  
This court should soundly reject that result and affirm the district court’s ruling 
that Section 1501 is unconstitutional.6/ 
                                                 
 
6/ The Necessary and Proper Clause does not save the individual mandate.  
That Clause “grants Congress broad authority to pass laws in furtherance of its 
constitutionally-enumerated powers.  This authority may only be constitutionally 
deployed when tethered to a lawful exercise of an enumerated power.”  Sebelius, 
728 F. Supp. 2d at 782.  Because the individual mandate is unconstitutional, the 
Necessary and Proper Clause “may not be employed to implement this affirmative 
duty to engage in private commerce.”  Id. 




BECAUSE SECTION 1501 IS NOT SEVERABLE FROM THE  
 
REMAINDER OF THE PPACA, THE ENTIRE ACT IS INVALID, 
 
AS THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DECIDED 
 
“The inquiry into whether a statute is severable is essentially an inquiry into 
legislative intent.”  Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 
172, 191 (1999).  “Congress could not have intended a constitutionally flawed 
provision to be severed from the remainder of the statute if the balance of the 
legislation is incapable of functioning independently.”  Alaska Airlines v. Brock, 
480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987).  A court must ask “whether [after removing the invalid 
provision] the [remaining] statute will function in a manner consistent with the 
intent of Congress.”  Id. at 685 (original emphasis omitted).  
Two factors demonstrate that Congress did not intend Section 1501 to be 
severable, and support the affirmance of the district court’s conclusion in that 
regard:  First, Congress removed a severability clause from an earlier version of 
health care reform legislation, and no such severability clause appears in the 
enacted version of the PPACA.  Second, the PPACA’s remaining portions cannot 
function “in a manner consistent with the intent of Congress” without Section 
1501.  See id. 
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The Affordable Health Care for America Act (H.R. 3962), which the House 
approved on November 7, 2009, contained an individual mandate section as well 
as a severability provision.7/  H.R. 3962’s severability provision, however, was not 
included in the final version of the PPACA.  Because Congress consciously 
decided not to include a severability clause in the PPACA, Congress obviously did 
not intend for the statute’s individual provisions to be severable. 
Congress could not have intended the individual mandate to be severable if 
severing it would allow an inoperable or counterproductive regulatory scheme to 
stand.  See Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 684; accord Free Enter. Fund. v Pub. Co. 
Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3161-62 (2010).  The PPACA forbids 
providers from refusing health insurance coverage to individuals because of 
preexisting conditions.  PPACA § 1201.  Without the individual mandate, a person 
could refuse to purchase health insurance until he incurred an actual injury or 
illness requiring medical care.  Without the individual mandate, the resulting free-
riding could soon cause any private or co-operative insurance provider that 
depends on premium dollars to become insolvent.  The PPACA contains 
exchanges made up of insurance providers, but does not contain any plan 
                                                 
 
7/ Affordable Health Care for America Act, H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. § 255 
(2009), available at Bill Summary & Status, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?d111:H.R.3962: (click on “Text of Legislation,” then the link for 
“Affordable Health Care for America Act (Engrossed in House [Passed House]-
EH)”). 
Case: 11-11021     Date Filed: 05/05/2011     Page: 39 of 43
30 
completely administered and supported by the federal government.  Because the 
envisioned insurance providers would depend upon premium dollars, the 
individual mandate is designed to bolster the providers’ solvency in each insurance 
exchange and thus the operation of the entire regulatory scheme.8/ 
Because the individual mandate is a foundation of the PPACA’s overall 
operation, Congress could not have intended the individual mandate to be 
severable from the rest of the PPACA.  In fact, it is fair to say that without the 
individual mandate, there would be no PPACA.  These observations, along with 
the fact that Congress deleted a severability provision from an earlier version of the 
national health care reform legislation, lead only to one conclusion:  the individual 
mandate is not severable from the PPACA’s remaining provisions.  Thus, because 
the individual mandate is unconstitutional, this court should rule the entire PPACA 
invalid, as did the district court. 
                                                 
 
8/ This does not mean that the connection between the individual mandate 
and the rest of the PPACA, while relevant to the severability issue, is a basis for 
concluding that the individual mandate is within Congress’s power under the 
Commerce or Necessary and Proper Clauses, as argued previously in this brief. 
 






 This court should affirm the district court’s final decision and judgment as 
they relate to the district court’s ruling (1) that Section 1501 is unconstitutional and 
(2) that Section 1501 is not severable from the rest of the PPACA, thereby causing 
the PPACA to be invalid in full.    




Jay Alan Sekulow* 
Stuart J. Roth* 
Colby M. May** 
American Center for Law & Justice 
201 Maryland Avenue, NE 
Washington, DC 20002 
202-546-8890 
 
*Admitted to 11th Circuit Bar 









    /s/ Edward L. White III   
    Edward L. White III* 
       Counsel of Record 
    American Center for Law & Justice 
    5068 Plymouth Road 
    Ann Arbor, Michigan 48105 
    734-662-2984 
 
    John P. Tuskey** 
    Laura Hernandez** 
    Erik M. Zimmerman** 
    American Center for Law & Justice 
     1000 Regent University Drive 
    Virginia Beach, Virginia 23464 
    757-226-2489 
  
Case: 11-11021     Date Filed: 05/05/2011     Page: 41 of 43
32 
CERTIFICATES PURSUANT TO FED. R. APP. P. 32 
 
 I certify that the foregoing amici curiae brief complies with the type-volume 
limitations of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B).  In reliance on the word count feature of 
the word-processing system used to prepare the brief, Microsoft Word 2007, the 
brief contains 6,869 words, excluding the parts of the brief exempted by Fed. R. 
App. P. 32(a)(7)(B)(iii), which is no more than one-half the maximum length of 
14,000 words authorized by Fed. R. App. P. 29(d), 32(a)(7)(B)(i).   
The foregoing amici curiae brief also complies with the typeface 
requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(5) and the type style requirements of Fed. R. 
App. P. 32(a)(6).  The brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced 14-point 
Times New Roman typeface. 
     Respectfully submitted, 
 
 
       /s/ Edward L. White III    
  Edward L. White III 
     Counsel of Record 
  American Center for Law & Justice 
  5068 Plymouth Road 
  Ann Arbor, Michigan 48105 
Dated:  May 4, 2011      734-662-2984 
Case: 11-11021     Date Filed: 05/05/2011     Page: 42 of 43
33 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
 I hereby certify that on May 4, 2011, by Federal Express next business day 
delivery, the original plus six true and correct copies of the foregoing amici curiae 
brief were caused to be sent to the following:  Clerk of Court, United States Court 
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, 56 Forsyth Street, N.W., Atlanta, Georgia 
30303, and two true and correct copies of the foregoing amici curiae brief was 
caused to be sent to each of the following counsel of record for the parties:  Alisa 
B. Klein, United States Department of Justice, 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., 
Room 7235, Washington, D.C. 20530, and Scott D. Makar, Office of the Attorney 
General, PL-01, The Capitol, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050. 
Upon direction from the Clerk of Court, an identical electronic copy of the 
foregoing amici curiae brief (with the only difference being the electronic signature 
of the undersigned substituted for the handwritten signature of the undersigned) 
shall be uploaded to the court’s CM/ECF system, which will automatically 
generate and send by electronic mail a Notice of Docket Activity to all registered 
attorneys participating in the case.  Such notice constitutes service on those 
registered attorneys.  
       /s/ Edward L. White III    
       Edward L. White III 
          Counsel of Record 
       American Center for Law & Justice 
       5068 Plymouth Road 
       Ann Arbor, Michigan 48105 
Case: 11-11021     Date Filed: 05/05/2011     Page: 43 of 43
